We study the welfare e¤ects of trade imbalances in a two-sector model of monopolistic competition. As in perfect competition, a trade surplus involves an income transfer to the de…cit country and possibly a terms-of-trade deterioration. Unlike the conventional wisdom, however, trade imbalances do not impose any double burden on surplus countries. This is because of a production-delocation e¤ect, which leads to a reduction in the local price index. In the presence of intermediate goods, new results arise: A trade surplus may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate, to a terms-of-trade improvement and even to a welfare increase. Numerical simulations show that, under realistic assumptions about preferences and technology, the bene…cial price-index e¤ect can signi…cantly reduce the direct cost of the transfer.
Introduction
Trade imbalances are a key feature of the latest wave of globalization. Although the Great Recession and the subsequent collapse of international trade led to a signi…cant correction, trade imbalances are still large and on the rise. For instance, as Figure 1 shows, Germany's total trade surplus in goods and services reached 6.7 percent of GDP in 2014, thereby exceeding the pre-crisis peak. In the same year, China's trade surplus and the U.S. trade de…cit equaled, respectively, 3.7 and 3 percent of their GDP. Moreover, in current U.S. dollars, China's and Germany's trade surpluses were, respectively, 40 and 15 percent larger in 2014 than in 2007.
Trade imbalances are not only large, they are also persistent. For instance, the United States have been running trade de…cits for 40 years in a row, and Germany and China trade surpluses for more than 20 consecutive years. This is a general and often overlooked feature of trading economies. For instance, in a sample of 70 countries with available data between 1960 and 2014, we have computed the maximum number of consecutive years in which each country experienced an imbalance of the same sign. Strikingly, the median value of this measure of persistence is 27 years (and the mean is nearly 30 years).
Moreover, for 6 countries in our sample, imbalances persisted with the same sign over the entire period of analysis (55 years).
Despite their prevalence, the welfare implications of these imbalances are not fully understood, because trade models typically focus on the assumption of balanced trade, while models of international …nance often focus on inter-temporal rather intra-temporal trade. This prevents the theory from shedding light on some recurrently debated issues.
For instance, China's integration into the world economy was accompanied by large and growing trade surpluses. Did this type of trade opening harm or bene…t China and its main trade partners? Similarly, it is widely believed that the creation of the eurozone, and the induced rigidities in the nominal exchange rates, led Germany to accumulate huge trade surpluses. Did this help or undermine the process of European economic integration?
More in general, what are the real e¤ects of the international transfers that are so frequent in …nancially integrated areas such as the eurozone?
Trade theory does provide the tools for answering these questions. However, the dominant approach in the literature on trade imbalances builds on the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale. This approach, whose intellectual history dates back to the debate between Ohlin and Keynes on the e¤ects of international transfers, was formalized by Samuelson (1954) and Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977) , and recently revived by Kortum (2007, 2008) . Its main lesson is that a trade surplus is unambiguously welfare reducing because it involves a double burden, i.e., an income transfer to the trading partner and a terms-of-trade deterioration. This conclusion is however at odds with the common wisdom surrounding policy debates. For instance, if trade imbalances always bene…t de…cit countries at the expense of surplus countries, how is it that the U.S. administration often complains that China's large bilateral trade surpluses are harming the U.S. economy? And how is it that China accumulated such large surpluses and tried to postpone as much as possible the rebalancing of its foreign trade? Similarly, how is it that trade imbalances within the eurozone are associated with the economic hegemony of surplus countries (by most macroeconomic indicators) and the stagnation or even the collapse of de…cit countries?
In this paper, we challenge the conclusions from the traditional approach and show that the so-called "new trade theory"can provide radically di¤erent and so far overlooked answers to old questions. To this purpose, we explore the welfare e¤ects of trade imbalances in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of monopolistic competition. Di¤erently from recent attempts at measuring well-known e¤ects of rebalancing (such as the double burden of a trade surplus) using trade models suitable for quantitative analysis, our aim is to highlight some unconventional possibilities. To bring these out with the greatest clarity, the model is stylized. Yet, it builds on standard assumptions and it is useful for illustrating some possibilities that seem to have been largely neglected in earlier discussions.
In addition, following the literature on international transfers, we study the e¤ects of an 3 exogenous imbalance without taking a stand on its causes.
We therefore formulate a two-sector, multi-country, general-equilibrium version of the model in Krugman (1980) that is standard in most respects: one sector produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, and the other produces di¤erentiated goods under monopolistic competition and costly trade. The main novelties are that the homogeneous good is nontraded and that trade imbalances arise whenever the exchange rate (i.e., the relative wage) is inconsistent with balanced trade.
These are realistic features: the di¤erentiated sector stands for manufacturing production, which is far more traded than services, and trade is not balanced in general. In contrast, many existing models of monopolistic competition (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Melitz and Redding, 2014) assume that the homogeneous good is freely traded and that trade is balanced.
As in the traditional theory, in our model a trade surplus involves an income transfer to the de…cit country and possibly a terms-of-trade deterioration. Unlike the standard theory, however, trade imbalances do not impose any double burden on surplus countries. This is because the model features a production-delocation e¤ect, in that a trade surplus requires a reallocation of labor towards tradables. In turn, as …rst shown in Venables (1987) , in the presence of trade costs the resulting increase in the number of local manufacturing …rms leads to a reduction in the local price index. A striking implication is that a trade surplus always leads to a reduction in the real price of traded goods which is ceteris paribus bene…cial. Thus, a surplus involves an income transfer on the one hand, and a bene…cial expansion in the traded sector on the other. The net welfare e¤ect is, in general, ambiguous, and we show that it can be positive when the elasticity of substitution between traded goods is low and trade costs are high. We show, however, that in our baseline setup the net welfare e¤ect is negative for reasonable parameter values.
Next, we consider a richer setup in which we allow for manufacturing intermediates in the production of …nal goods. We …nd that intermediate goods, which account for more than two thirds of international trade, can dramatically change our quantitative and qualitative conclusions. In particular, we …nd that a trade surplus may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate, to a terms-of-trade improvement and even to a welfare increase under reasonable parameter con…gurations. We then simulate the model's behavior under two di¤erent scenarios replicating the imbalances of China and Germany, the two largest surplus countries in the world. In both cases, the bene…cial price-index e¤ect reduces signi…cantly the direct cost of the transfer. This …nding is con…rmed when we extend our analysis to allow for more general assumptions about preferences and technology, for endogenous labor supply and for variable markups.
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Finally, we perform a di¤erent but related thought experiment: rather than studying the price e¤ect of an exogenous increase in the transfer, as in most of the literature, we study instead what happens if a government …xes the international relative wage, i.e., the exchange rate. For example, the Chinese government might have been intervening in the international capital markets so as to avoid any deterioration of the country's competitiveness. Since in our model the general-equilibrium relationship between the exchange rate and the transfer is dictated by a trade-imbalance condition, one might suspect that …xing the exchange rate or the transfer is immaterial for the results. We …nd that, surprisingly, this is not the case in the presence of intermediate goods. The reason is that intermediate goods give rise to agglomeration economies through the cost and demand linkages between producers of intermediate and …nal goods, as in Krugman and Venables (1995) . With …xed relative wages, agglomeration economies imply that, depending on the parameter con…gurations, the manufacturing sector may tend to concentrate in one country.
These results have far-reaching implications. They may help explain why a country like China, who resists the real appreciation of its currency through the accumulation of foreign reserves and capital controls, can become a 'world factory'. 1 They also revisit some insights from the 'new economic geography'literature (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).
In particular, we …nd that a crucial condition for agglomeration is the lack of adjustment of relative wages. 2 So long as relative wages are endogenous, the symmetric equilibrium is always stable under balanced trade and agglomeration is impossible. Under a …xed relative wage, instead, the model properties are the same as in Krugman and Venables (1995) : the symmetric balanced-trade equilibrium may become unstable, in which case manufacturing …rms start to agglomerate in the surplus country.
Besides the literature on the e¤ects of rebalancing already mentioned (especially Dekle, Eaton and Kortum, 2007 , and Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2007 , our paper is related to the classical debate on how international transfers a¤ect the terms of trade and welfare for the donor and recipient countries. The large research e¤ort that followed the controversy between Ohlin and Keynes has shown that, in theory, the terms-of-trade and welfare e¤ects of a transfer can go either way (e.g., Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta, 1983) . Although a transfer could conceivably improve the donor's terms of trade so much as to increase its welfare, the conditions for this outcome are considered more stringent than those for immiserizing growth, and this possibility is therefore deemed a theoretical curiosity. In practice, the widespread presumption is that nontraded goods and costly trade generate a home bias in consumption, which implies that a transfer causes a deterioration of the donors'terms of trade and hence a double burden. Our results challenge this conventional view. It is precisely in the presence of trade costs that the entry margin can turn the adverse terms-of-trade e¤ect of the transfer into a favorable change of the price level in the donor country. Moreover, with traded intermediate inputs, production costs can fall so much in the donor country that a rise in wages (hence an improvement in the terms of trade) is needed to restore the equilibrium.
The closest paper to ours is Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), who develop a twocountry model of monopolistic competition to study how the entry margin a¤ects the price e¤ects of a transfer. Similarly to us, they …nd that the implications for prices can be very di¤erent when the adjustment occurs at the extensive margin. Di¤erently from us, however, they do not …nd that entry can lower the real cost of the transfer for the sending country. The main reason for this di¤erence is that they treat varieties and entry symmetrically in the traded and nontraded sector. However, existing evidence (see next section) suggests that scale economies are more prevalent in manufacturing sectors. For this reason, we prefer to model an asymmetry across sector, shutting down the variety e¤ect entirely in the nontraded sector, which is assumed to produce a homogeneous good.
A key advantage of our speci…cation is that of making our unconventional results most transparent. Di¤erent from Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), in addition, we also consider intermediate goods, which play an important role in our analysis. This paper also contributes to the growing literature trying to bridge trade theory and international …nance. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) were among the …rst to recognize that introducing explicitly trade costs helps explaining various puzzles in international macroeconomics. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) show that adding endogenous varieties contributes at explaining international business cycles. Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007) study the e¤ect of various shocks when entry and trade costs give rise to a "home-market e¤ect" but without intermediate goods. 3 Our model shows that these ingredients can change signi…cantly the welfare implications of trade imbalances. Since the production-delocation e¤ect implies that a devaluation has a bene…cial e¤ect on the price index, it is plausible to conjecture that this mechanism can help explaining why, as widely believed in policy circles, devaluations can be welfare improving. 4 Finally, in this paper we model imbalances as exogenous transfers in a static setup with no uncertainty. We do this to preserve comparability to the literature on international transfers and show how the results are a¤ected by …rms'location decisions. In more general models, the welfare implications may also depend on whether imbalances arise from intertemporal decisions and on the extent of international …nancial integration. 5 Interestingly, Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007) …nd that the home-market e¤ect can have di¤erent implications with enough risk sharing. In particular, they …nd, inter alia, that a productivity shock leads to smaller price adjustments and larger quantity adjustments under full insurance. 6 This echoes our case with a …xed exchange rate. However, in reality international risk sharing is imperfect and probably more relevant when studying productivity shocks than an exogenous international transfer. In any case, we view the mechanism illustrated in this paper as an important component for a more complete understanding of the macroeconomic e¤ects of trade imbalances. 7 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To better motivate our theoretical analysis, we begin in Section 2 by discussing the empirical foundations of our main assumptions.
In Section 3 we formulate our baseline model with monopolistic competition and trade costs. In Section 4 we extend the model by adding intermediate goods, endogenous labour supply and variable markups. In Section 5 we study the e¤ects of …xing the relative wage rather than the trade imbalance. Section 6 concludes.
Motivating Evidence: Trade Imbalances and Production Structure
Our theory builds on the assumption that trade imbalances are non-neutral on a country's production structure, and that the latter matters because of important technological asymmetries across sectors. We now discuss the evidence in support of these key assumptions.
To begin with, Figure 2 plots the industry share of GDP on the vertical axis, which proxies for the importance of tradable goods in total value added, and the trade surplus in goods and services as a share of GDP on the horizontal axis. 8 We measure both variables at current prices and report their …ve-year average between 2005 and 2009. As the …gure shows, trade surpluses are strongly positively correlated with the industry share of GDP, monopolistic competition and sunk entry costs that stabilizing policies can foster competitiveness. 5 See Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013) for a case in which the transfer is endogenous. 6 See also Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) and the recent synthesis in Corsetti, Dedola and Viani (2012) on the role of international …nancial markets in explaining the e¤ects of productivity shocks on the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. 7 Trade imbalances may also have additional e¤ects. See for instance Crino'and Epifani (2014) for an analysis of their distributional implications. 8 In our data, Industry corresponds to ISIS divisions 10-45 and includes all manufacturing activities. and trade imbalances account for 30 percent of the cross-country variation in industrial production. 9 Next we perform a more systematic analysis, so as to also exploit the time variation in (1), we show the results of a baseline …xed-e¤ects regression without controls, using annual data; in column (2), we add time dummies and the openness ratio; moreover, following Rodrik (2016), we also control for (the log of) population and per capita income, and their squared terms. In column (3), we add countryspeci…c linear trends to further control for the fact that countries with di¤erent income levels may experience di¤erent patterns of structural change. In column (4), we trim our sample by excluding observations in the …rst and 99th percentiles of the distribution of trade imbalances. Across all speci…cations, the coe¢ cient on the trade surplus is always positive and very precisely estimated.
In columns (5)- (8), we study the sensitivity of our results with respect to the proxy for trade imbalances. In particular, we rerun our most conservative regression speci…cation in column (3) by using alternative measures of imbalances. In column (5) we consider only trade in goods (i.e., we exclude net trade in services); in column (6) we exclude trade in fuels; in columns (7) and (8) we use instead broader measures of imbalances, respectively, the current account and international reserves. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on these proxies is always very precisely estimated and generally similar in size, suggesting that all these measures of imbalances are associated with a signi…cant change in the production structure.
In columns (9) and (10), we rerun the same regression speci…cations as in columns (2) and (3) by taking …ve-year averages of our variables instead of using annual data. This may help to reduce the impact of outliers and measurement error and is informative about the persistence of our correlations beyond the very short run. Interestingly, the results are essentially identical.
As a further robustness check, in Table 2 we rerun the same regression speci…cations as in Table 1 by measuring our variables in …rst di¤erences rather than in levels. Speci…cally, in columns (1)- (8) we take the …rst di¤erences of annual data, and in columns (9)- (10) the …rst di¤erences of …ve-year averages. Note that changes in the trade surplus are strongly positively associated with changes in the production structure, and that the coe¢ cient of interest is always very precisely estimated.
To sum up, our results show a strong correlation between trade imbalances and industrial production, across countries and overtime, using di¤erent measures of imbalances and controlling for a number of covariates. These results are also consistent with, and complementary to, some key …ndings in Rodrik (2008) . Speci…cally, Rodrik shows that a measure of currency undervaluation is strongly positively correlated with the industry share of GDP and with economic growth.
Having argued that trade imbalances are non-neutral on a country's production structure, we now brie ‡y mention some evidence suggesting that a country's production structure matters because of the existence of signi…cant asymmetries between sectors. First, scale economies are believed to be more prevalent in manufacturing sectors. For instance, Buera and Kaboski (2012) show that average …rm scale is much larger in manufacturing than in services, suggesting that …xed costs are larger in the former. Innovation is also heavily concentrated in manufacturing. In particular, the U.S. manufacturing sector accounts for more than two-thirds of R&D spending and more than three-quarters of U.S. corporate patents despite accounting for less than one-tenth of U.S. private non-farm employment (Autor et al., 2016) .
Second, backward linkages are also stronger in manufacturing. For instance, using input-output tables, Yamano and Ahmad (2006) …nd that the ratio of manufacturing intermediates to value added plus intermediates is around 0.5 in the manufacturing sector, a value that is ten times higher than the corresponding …gure in services. Due to substantial linkages with many other sectors, manufacturing output also stimulates economic activity more than any other sector. For instance, calculations from the BEA input-output tables
show that manufacturing output induces three times as much demand in other sectores than retail and wholesale trade. Agglomeration spillovers are also found to be large in manufacturing. For instance, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) estimate that the opening of a large manufacturing plant has a signi…cant positive impact on total factor productivity of incumbent plants in the same county.
Finally, trade costs are also asymmetric across sectors. It is well known that traded goods mainly consist of industrial products. More in general, trade costs are lower in more R&D-intensive sectors in which intra-industry trade is more prevalent and where the home-market e¤ect is expected to be quantitatively more important (e.g., Davis, 1998) .
We now develop a model that builds on these observations, namely, that trade imbalances are associated with a relocation of manufacturing …rms which have important spillover e¤ects on the rest of the economy.
The Price-Index Effect of Trade Imbalances

Baseline Setup
Overview. Consider a world consisting of N +1 countries: Home, indexed by i = h, and N Foreign, each indexed by i = f . While Home is allowed to di¤er from Foreign, for simplicity all the N Foreign are identical to each other. There is one homogenous production factor, labor, with endowments L h and L f . All countries produce a homogeneous nontraded good, S, and a di¤erentiated traded good M (henceforth, manufacturing goods).
The nontraded good is produced under perfect competition, using one e¢ ciency unit of labor to produce one unit of output. Following Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), we choose the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor as the numeraire in each country and denote by the exchange rate, de…ned as the price of Foreign's numeraire in terms of Home's.
According to this convention, a rise of represents an exchange rate depreciation in Home.
Due to symmetry, the exchange rate between any pair of Foreign is one. The traded sector is monopolistically competitive à la Dixit-Stiglitz: a large mass of symmetric …rms produce di¤erentiated goods using a …xed cost f and a variable cost 1= in e¢ ciency units of labor. There are iceberg trade costs: > 1 units must be shipped in order for one unit to 10 arrive at the destination.
Preferences. Preferences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
C i (S) is consumption of a nontraded good; C i (M ) is consumption of a CES aggregate of di¤erentiated traded goods, indexed by z 2 n, where n is the total mass of manufacturing …rms in all countries; > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two traded goods. 10 The ideal price index associated with C i (M ) is:
wherep i (z) is the local-currency …nal price of variety z, gross of any trade cost.
Trade imbalances are modeled as a transfer T i from the surplus country (Home, i.e., Maximization of (1) implies that C i (M )P i = 1. Consumption of the nontraded good therefore equals: 11
Substituting C i (S) and C i (M ) = 1=P i into (1) yields the indirect utility function: 12
Evidently, welfare is decreasing in the transfer and in the price index of manufacturing goods, as both lead to a reduction in consumption. Recall that in standard models with perfect competition a trade surplus involves a transfer T i and a higher price index P i (due to the induced terms-of-trade deterioration) and is therefore unambiguously welfare reducing. As shown below, matters are more interesting in monopolistic competition.
Price Indexes. Goods-market equilibrium in Home requires the equality between supply and demand for each traded good:
where q h is the output; d h and x h are, respectively, the domestic and export demand for a good produced in Home. 13 Similarly, for each Foreign-produced good:
where d f is local demand, x f h is demand from Home and x f f is demand from the other (N 1) Foreign. Utility maximization implies:
where p i is the local-currency price of a locally produced good, and E i = L i is the total expenditure on manufacturing goods in country i. As usual, demand for a given good is increasing in the price index P i and decreasing in its own price, with an elasticity equal to . Hence, a depreciation (a rise of ) increases Home …rms'exports at the expense of Foreign's.
Pro…t maximization and symmetry in imply
The Home terms of trade, de…ned as the common-currency price of imports in terms of exports, are therefore equal to in this baseline model. Free entry and symmetry in f imply instead a break-even level of output equal to q h = q f = q = f ( 1) . Without loss of generality, from now on we normalize p = 1 and q = 1. Thus, using (6) in (4) and (5) yields:
where 1 2 (0; 1) is a measure of trade freeness. These free-entry conditions imply a negative relationship between P h and P f : to keep sales unchanged, a fall in Foreign demand must be compensated by a rise in Home demand. Moreover, since …rms do not have to pay the transport cost to sell in their domestic market, the Home market is relatively more important to Home …rms than it is to Foreign …rms.
Solving (7) for P h and P f yields an expression for the two price indexes:
Strikingly, P h is monotonically decreasing in and P f is monotonically increasing in in the feasible range. Thus, a depreciation of Home's exchange rate (a rise of ) leads to a reduction in the Home price index and to an increase in the Foreign price index. The intuition for this result is as follows. An increase in makes Home producers relatively more competitive. To restore free entry, demand must fall for Home …rms and rise for Foreign …rms. Since Home …rms are relatively more sensitive to local demand, the adjustment can only happen through a reduction in P h and an increase in P f . 14 The fall in the local price index after a depreciation may sound paradoxical at …rst.
After all, an increase in makes imported varieties more expensive and this tends to increase the price index. So, how can the adjustment take place? The answer, as we show formally next, is through a change in the mass of Home and Foreign …rms.
Mass of Firms. We now determine the equilibrium mass of Home and Foreign …rms,
n h and n f respectively. Using (2) yields:
As (9) makes it clear, keeping the number of …rms constant, an increase in raises P h .
However, entry tends to lower the price index. Solving (9) for n h and n f , and using (8), yields:
Note that n h is increasing in and n f decreasing: a depreciation, by increasing the pro…tability of Home …rms at the expense of Foreign …rms, induces …rm delocation from
Foreign to Home, implying that home consumers save the trade cost on the varieties whose production has moved from the Foreign country. As demonstrated by equation (8) , this second e¤ect through entry dominates, because an increase in lowers the price index in
Home and rises it in Foreign. This result, that a devaluation lowers the price index due to the change in the number of …rms, is similar to the production-delocation e¤ect …rst noticed by Venables (1987) in the context of an iceberg import tari¤. 15 Trade Imbalances. The local-currency value of Home's exports (gross of trade costs) equals X h = p h x h N n h . Thus, using (6),
Similarly, the gross exports of the N Foreign countries to Home are:
Hence, the local-currency value of Home's trade surplus, T h = X h X f , equals:
Using (8) and (10) in (11) yields our key trade-imbalance condition:
Importantly, equation (12) dictates the general equilibrium relationship between T h and . Simple inspection reveals that T h is increasing in : hence, a trade surplus leads to a depreciation of the exchange rate in this baseline model.
Notice that, imposing T h = 0, equation (12) pins down the exchange rate , and thus the terms of trade, consistent with balanced trade. It is easy to show that, if countries are symmetric, then T h = 0 implies = 1. In the presence of asymmetries, instead, the relative wage and the terms of trade will tend to be higher in the country with a larger domestic market (high L i ). The latter result is a consequence of the familiar "home market e¤ect".
We summarize the main comparative statics to a change in T h in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 A transfer T h from Home to Foreign leads to: a) a depreciation of the exchange rate (a reduction in Home's relative wage and a terms-of-trade deterioration), b) an increase in the mass of manufacturing …rms n h , and c) a reduction in the price
The Transfer Problem Revisited
We are now in the position to discuss the welfare e¤ects of a transfer T h from Home to Foreign. Home transfers tradable varieties for a value T h to Foreign. Given quasi-linear preferences, at constant prices this additional income would be absorbed entirely by an increase in consumption of the Foreign nontraded good, which requires a reallocation of Foreign labor away from the traded sectors. Similarly, the fall in Home income would be absorbed by lowering consumption of the nontraded good, which requires a reallocation of Home labor to the traded sector. Given that …rm size is …xed, n h rises and n f falls.
In the absence of trade costs, this substitution of …rms would not a¤ect prices, and this would be the end of the story. However, in the presence of trade costs, the relocation of production reduces the price index in the Home country, where there are now more active …rms, and raises it in the Foreign country, where fewer …rms are left. In turn, the fall in P h and the rise in P f lower the demand for Home goods and raise the demand for Foreign goods. To restore the equilibrium, the Home wage must fall relative to Foreign, which corresponds to a depreciation of the exchange rate (higher ). The e¤ect of a small transfer on the total number of varieties is in general ambiguous as it depends on the nature of country asymmetries. If the countries are symmetric, however, the fall in P h is exactly compensated by the rise in P f and the total number of …rms does not change.
Notice that, similarly to standard models, the transfer leads to a terms-of-trade deterioration for the sending country. However, contrary to those models, the variety e¤ect implies that this terms-of-trade deterioration is, in itself, welfare improving for the sending countries. Thus, what has been so far considered a "double burden"can actually alleviate the welfare cost of a transfer.
More formally, recall that Home welfare is given by:
The change in Home welfare after a transfer T h is
where P h;0 and P h;T are the Home price indexes with T h = 0 and T h > 0, respectively.
The …rst term is the direct cost of the transfer, the second is the e¤ect due to the change in the price index. In turn, the latter e¤ect can be expressed as
Let e V h = T h =L h be the hypothetical welfare cost of the transfer at constant prices.
Hence, the real cost of the transfer relative to a model with no price index e¤ect, denoted by T R , is
We will use T R as a metric to assess by how much the price index e¤ect can lower the real cost of a given transfer. In particular, notice that T R = 1 if 0 = T , that is, when relative wages do not move. As long as T > 0 , the depreciation in Home is associated with a lower price index, which reduces the real cost of the transfer by the factor T R < 1.
Can the price index e¤ect be so large as to make the transfer welfare improving for the surplus country? In other words, can T R turn negative? The striking answer is yes, as stated formally below:
Proposition 2 The e¤ ect on Home welfare of a transfer T h to Foreign is ambiguous:
In the special case of N = 1 (two countries) and no asymmetries between Home and Foreign, the determinants of the bene…cial price-index e¤ect can be easily characterized analytically: a transfer is more likely to be welfare increasing for low values of and high trade costs, . For standard parameter values the net welfare e¤ect is negative. As we show in the next section through numerical simulations, however, the positive price-index e¤ect can be signi…cant.
So far, we have seen that a trade surplus leads to a fall in prices which increases the purchasing power in Home. Besides being derived from conventional assumptions, this result is also realistic. For instance, the fact that Chinese consumers bene…ted from the relocation of industrial production to their home country is hard to dispute. Yet, this is probably the less important part of the story. As we show in the next section, in the presence of traded intermediates, agglomeration of industrial production is not just bene…cial for consumers, it also improves the competitiveness of Chinese …rms.
Imbalances with Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods play a prominent role in international trade. As already noted by Ethier (1982) more than thirty years ago, "I cannot resist the temptation to point out that producers' goods are in fact much more prominent in trade than are consumers' goods". Recent estimates con…rm his insight: by now, intermediate products account
for about two-thirds of the volume of world trade. In the rest of the paper we therefore consider a more general setup in which di¤erentiated intermediate goods are used in the production of …nal goods.
The Model with Intermediates
To model intermediate goods, we follow Krugman and Venables (1995) . Speci…cally, we assume that the total cost function (in units of local currency) of a manufacturing …rm located in country i is
where w i = 1 is the wage and P i is the price index of manufacturing goods. This formulation implies that manufacturing goods enter the production function for other manufacturing goods (as intermediates) and the utility function (as …nal goods) through the same CES aggregator. The price and marginal cost of a manufacturing good are now decreasing in the local price index:
where the latter equality follows from our normalization.
This formulation gives rise to agglomeration economies through the cost linkages between producers of intermediates and …nal goods. This is because agglomeration allows local producers of …nal goods to save on the trade costs of intermediate inputs, which reduces P i and therefore increases, ceteris paribus, the revenue and pro…ts of manufacturing …rms.
Eq. (13) also implies that in each country the total expenditure on intermediate goods is a constant share of the value of local manufacturing production. As a consequence, country i's total expenditure on manufacturing goods is now endogenous and is given by:
Eq. (15) gives rise to agglomeration economies through the demand linkages between producers of intermediates and …nal goods. This is because agglomeration leads to an increase in …rms' sales of intermediate inputs and therefore increases, ceteris paribus, their revenue and pro…ts.
As in the previous section, using (14) in (6) and (4) we can solve for the price indexes:
To express the equilibrium mass of Home and Foreign …rms, we solve for n h and n f from the price index (2):
Finally, the local-currency value of Home's trade surplus equals T h = X h X f , where
Hence, using (17) we obtain:
Using (14) in (15), (16), (17) , and (18) yields a system of 5 equations in P h , P f , E h , E f and .
Transfer and Prices: Analytic Results
The above system is highly non linear and does not admit in general analytic solutions.
Hence, to gain insight on the model's mechanics, we begin by considering a simpli…ed symmetric two-country version of the model in which we study the comparative-statics e¤ects of a small transfer in neighborhood of the symmetric, zero transfer, equilibrium.
The analysis is greatly simpli…ed because the symmetric equilibrium (with T i = 0) is easy to characterize. Linearizing the system we can prove (see the Appendix) the following results:
Then, in a neighborhood of T i = 0, a small transfer from Home to Foreign lowers the price index in Home:
The e¤ ect of the transfer on the exchange rate (Home's relative wage) is instead ambiguous:
Thus, as in the baseline model, a trade surplus leads to a reduction in the price index in the relevant range (i.e., for (1 ) > 1). 16 However, unlike in the baseline model, the sign of d =dT h is now in general ambiguous. In particular, d =dT h turns negative when agglomeration forces are strong enough, namely, when is su¢ ciently large, or and are su¢ ciently low. The intuition for this surprising result is simple: by inducing the expansion in the traded sector, a trade surplus strengthens agglomeration forces, and when these are strong enough, they are the key determinant of a country's competitiveness. It follows that the push to competitiveness given by agglomeration forces may require an o¤setting appreciation, rather than a depreciation, of the exchange rate.
Simulations
We now turn to numerical examples. To start with, we show the e¤ects of non-in…nitesimal transfers in the symmetric case. Panel a) of Figure 3 plots V h;T V h;0 , where V h;0 is Home welfare in T h = 0, as a function of T h for di¤erent values of , the key parameter regulating the strength of agglomeration forces in our model. 17 In all cases we set = 3 and = 2:7. Note that, for = 0, we are back in the baseline setup and welfare is monotonically decreasing in the trade surplus relative to the balanced-trade equilibrium. For = 0:3 and = 0:4 the qualitative results are unchanged, but the curve is less steep, the more so the higher is . Finally, for = 0:5 the results are reversed: welfare is now an inverted-U function of T h . In other words, when agglomeration forces are strong enough, 1 6 This is the so-called no-black-hole condition (see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999, p. 58). It is equivalent to assuming that agglomeration forces are not too strong. Note also that, in the presence of intermediate goods, the monopolistic distortion is captured by the term [ (1 ) 1] 1 , and that the latter becomes negative when the no-black-hole condition is violated, a case arguably di¢ cult to interpret. This provides a further justi…cation for the standard assumption that (1 ) > 1. 1 7 Note that, ignoring exogenous terms, V h;0 = ln P h;0 = States have approximately the same aggregate economic size. With these parameters, we study the e¤ect of a transfer from Home equal to 2% of its GDP.
In the second scenario, we consider a surplus country (Home) with the economic size of Germany trading with twenty-seven countries (Foreign) that capture the other EU member states. We normalize the labor force of Germany to one, L h = 1; and set L f = 0:2 so as to match the fact that Germany accounts for about 16% of the combined EU population.
We then set Y h = 6 to obtain a manufacturing share of 0:16, consistent with the EU average, and Y f = 4:5. The latter …gure matches the observation that GDP per capita in the average EU country is about 75% of the German level. In the case of Germany, we study the e¤ect of a transfer from Home equal to 4% of its GDP.
Regarding the remaining parameters, we experiment with various combinations. To assess the role of intermediate inputs, we consider the version of the model with no intermediates, = 0, and the more realistic case in which their cost share is = 0:51, which is consistent with the U.S. input-output table. 18 As for the elasticity of substitution between product varieties, we consider two values: = 3, which is close to the "macro"
estimates often used in studies on current account adjustments, and = 5, which is closer tax-equivalent estimate of overall trade costs of 170% for industrialized countries; and a more moderate level = 1:7, as in Melitz and Redding (2015) . For each con…guration of parameters, we will compute the value of export as a share of GDP in the surplus country.
This will help us to gauge which combination of and yields more realistic volumes of trade, and also how the price-index e¤ect depends on the export share.
The main e¤ects of the transfer in the …rst scenario are reported in In the most extreme case (column 8), corresponding nonetheless to parameter values used in the literature, the transfer is actually welfare improving for the sending country! Looking at the impact on the exchange rate, Table 3 The e¤ect of the transfer in the second scenario is reported in Table 4 EU partners, which varies in the data within the range of 18% 22% of GDP.
Robustness
So far, we have deliberately relied on a number of simplifying assumptions in order to put our results in sharper relief and make our analysis more transparent. We are now in the position to discuss how relaxing some of these assumptions a¤ects the main results.
Preferences and Technology. We have assumed that preferences are non homothetic and quasi linear, in this following a large theoretical literature on trade policy. Quasilinear preferences are analytically convenient but somewhat restrictive, as they imply no income e¤ects in the demand for manufacturing goods, and a constant marginal utility from consumption of the nontraded good.
We now assume, instead, that preferences are homothetic and Cobb Douglas. 19 This tends to weaken our results for two main reasons. First, they imply a decreasing (rather than a constant) marginal utility from consumption of the nontraded good, and therefore an increasing opportunity cost of expanding the manufacturing sector after a trade surplus.
Second, with Cobb-Douglas preferences a trade surplus implies, ceteris paribus, a fall of (rather than a constant) expenditure on manufacturing goods, and therefore a smaller size of the domestic market and weaker agglomeration forces. In this section we therefore want to quantify by how much our results are weakened under reasonable parameter con…gurations when preferences are Cobb Douglas rather than quasi linear.
Moreover, so far we have assumed that manufacturing intermediate goods are used only in the production of manufacturing goods. Although this is a reasonable approximation, allowing for traded manufacturing inputs in the production function for the nontraded good should weaken our results, as this reduces the asymmetry between the traded and nontraded sector. The question that the we would like to address now is by how much.
To this end, in this section we assume that the local-currency price and unit cost of the nontraded good in country i is
where w i = 1 is the wage, P i the price index of manufacturing goods, and s is the cost and revenue share of manufacturing intermediates in the nontraded sector. 20 The production function for good S assumed so far is therefore a special case of this more general formulation for s = 0.
Formally, with Cobb-Douglas preferences the utility function in (1) is replaced by:
where 2 (0; 1) now represents the exogenous consumption expenditure share of manufacturing goods. Maximization of (19) yields:
where, as before, Y i T i =L i is the expenditure per capita in country i (with T h > 0 and
, and Y i is the labor e¢ ciency of one worker. Using (20) in (19), and noting that ln P i (S) = s ln P i , yields a new expression for Home's indirect utility function: 
. Thus, equations (15) are now replaced by the following expressions:
The rest of the model is unchanged. Thus, using (22) and (14) in (16), (17), and (18) yields a system of 5 equations in P h , P f , E h , E f and that can be easily solved numerically.
By (21), the change in Home welfare after a transfer T h is
where P h;0 and P h;T are the Home price indexes of manufacturing goods with T h = 0 and T h > 0, respectively, and
is the hypothetical welfare change at constant prices. Thus, the real cost of the transfer relative to a model with no price index e¤ect is:
We now simulate the extended model using the same baseline parameters values as in the previous section. To save space, however, we only focus on the scenario corresponding to China trading with the United States and Europe. Regarding the cost share of manufacturing intermediates in the nontraded sector, we set s = 0:05, consistent with the U.S. input-output tables. 21 As for the share of manufacturing goods in consumption expenditure, using the manufacturing share of GDP as a proxy we obtain an equal to 0:12 in the United States and 0:31 in China. We therefore simulate the model in both cases = 0:12 and = 0:31 to have a sense of how the results change when considering the plausible range of values for this parameter. The results are reported in Table 5 .
Comparing the new simulations in Table 5 to those in Table 3 , we see that the bene…cial price index e¤ect is now weaker but still signi…cant, with T R ranging from 0:77 to 0:16.
The average across simulations implies that the price e¤ect can lower the real cost of the transfer to 56% of its value. Moreover, we con…rm the previous …nding that, excluding the case = 5 and = 2:7, the transfer leads to a rise in the Home relative wage, and the appreciation is of the same order of magnitude as before. Finally, in all cases, the transfer still triggers a large relocation of …rms from Foreign to Home and the size of the phenomenon is similar to the previous simulations.
Endogenous Labor Supply. Another interesting question, explored for example in
Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), is how the income transfer and the implied changes in relative prices a¤ect the supply of labor, and what are its welfare consequences. To isolate the …rm relocation e¤ect, in our benchmark case we assumed labor e¤ort to be …xed. However, it is not di¢ cult to relax this assumption. Doing so will show that the transfer induces agents to work more in the surplus country and less in the receiving country, thereby amplifying the production relocation e¤ect.
Following Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), we generalize preferences by adding disutility from labor:
where l i is the supply of labor of the representative agent and is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Substituting C i (M ) and C i (S) from (20) after taking into account that labor income is now Y i l i yields:
The …rst-order condition for labor e¤ort, l i , is: Note: = 1; all other parameters as in Table 5 . Table 6 : Robustness, Endogenous Labor Supply
Clearly, l i increases with the transfer. The intuition is that the transfer lowers income and hence raises the marginal utility from consumption, which increases the value of working.
Note also that, without the transfer, (23) yields l i = 1, as before. Moreover, the extended model nests the benchmark case with exogenous labor supply, which corresponds to the limit ! 1:
Home's indirect utility function generalizes to:
Expenditures on traded goods are still given by (22) after replacing total labor income with Y i l i L i . Following the same steps as before, de…ne V h the change in Home welfare after a transfer T h and e V h the hypothetical welfare change at constant prices. Then, the real cost of the transfer relative to a model with no price index e¤ect is now
With these new expressions, we now replicate the simulations in Table 6 . Following Table 6 . Comparing %n h and %n f in Table 6 and in Table 3 we see that, given the increase in the hours worked in the surplus country and its contraction in de…cit countries, the relocation of …rms from Foreign to Home is now larger. The reduction in the Home price index due to the increase in employment more than compensate the higher disutility from labor, or else agents would not have chosen to work more hours. Hence, the real cost of the transfer is lower than in the case with exogenous labor supply.
Intensive Margin and Variable Markups. In the model studied so far …rm size is …xed, so that the adjustment in production can only occur through a change in the number of operating …rms, i.e., along the extensive margin. Given the importance of the number of …rms for welfare, we would like to know how much our quantitative results could change if …rms can also adjust their scale, i.e., when the intensive margin is also active. Recall that …rm size is pinned down by the free entry condition, q = f ( 1) . As it is well known, q is constant if markups do not vary. However, …rm size will adjust endogenously in the presence of pro-competitive e¤ects. A simple way of allowing for this possibility, inspired to Krugman (1979) , is to postulate that the demand elasticity perceived by a …rm, i , is a function of the number of local competitors:
where the new parameter & regulates the strength of the pro-competitive e¤ect. The benchmark model corresponds to & = 0. The equilibrium quantity and price of a variety are:
With this formulation, an increase in the number of …rms in a given location raises the competitive pressure and induces …rms to lower their markup and expand their size. Hence, total production adjusts both along the intensive and the extensive margin. While the literature has proposed many micro-foundations for this e¤ect, we captures it in a simple and ‡exible way.
We now replicate the simulation in Table 6 assuming & = 1, which under our parametrization implies that the extensive margin is roughly twice as reactive than the intensive margin. This is consistent with the …nding in Hummels and Klenow (2005) that the extensive margin accounts for two-thirds of the greater exports of larger economies. On the other hand, it also implies a rather strong change in markups. The results are shown in Table 7 , which also reports the change in …rm size in Home ( %q h ). Compared to Table   6 , …rm relocations and hence the price e¤ect are weaker. Nevertheless, even in this case the real cost of the transfer is reduced signi…cantly, to 85% 49% of its value.
Imbalances and Agglomeration
So far we have treated the transfer T h as exogenous and the exchange rate as endogenous.
That is, we have implicitly assumed that the transfer is determined outside the model, either by the saving decision of agents as in the intertemporal approach to the current account (see e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1995) ; or by the active intervention of a government, Although this is a scenario that has received signi…cant attention in the literature, it
28
is not the only relevant case. Rather than choosing T h , a government could equally choose a value for , and adjust actively the transfer in order to reach its target. For example, the Chinese government might have been intervening in the international capital markets so as to avoid any deterioration of the country's competitiveness.
Since the general equilibrium relationship between T h and is dictated by a tradeimbalance condition, one may expect that treating T h or as exogenous should not a¤ect the results. This is indeed the case in our baseline model without intermediate goods.
Interestingly, however, this is not necessarily true in the presence of intermediate goods,
as the latter give rise to agglomeration economies and the possibility of multiple equilibria (see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) . As a consequence, …xing T h or …xing may make a di¤erence for the results. This is because …xing the size of the transfer is also equivalent to preventing agglomeration forces from fully deploying the circular and cumulative causation processes that lead to agglomeration. In contrast, …xing the exchange rate (or relative wages) can unleash agglomeration forces, because it prevents o¤setting relative price changes.
To make our point, we use the model with intermediate goods to compare two scenarios:
in the …rst the transfer is exogenously …xed at T h = 0; in the second, the exchange rate is exogenously …xed at the balanced-trade level. Moreover, to obtain analytical results and simplify the comparison with Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita, Krugman and
Venables (1999), we focus on two symmetric countries. This implies that in both cases a symmetric equilibrium always exists. The key question is therefore whether the symmetric 29 equilibrium is also stable. The main result will be to show that keeping relative wages …xed can turn the symmetric equilibrium unstable, leading to agglomeration of manufacturing in the country that starts to run a trade surplus.
To study the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium, we closely follow Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) . Speci…cally, we denote by w i the maximum wage (in local currency) that a manufacturing …rm can pay and break even and we study how it varies out of equilibrium as a function of manufacturing employment, denoted by i . Recall that, as in the previous section, the wage paid by the nontraded sector in each country is the numeraire and is the exchange rate between the two numeraires. In equilibrium, w i = 1 in both countries under our assumption that the nontraded good is always produced in both countries. Yet, if we perturb the equilibrium by moving some …rms from one country to the other, i.e., by changing i , then w i will change as well. Then, the relationship between w i and i can be used to study the stability of the symmetric equilibrium. If this relationship is negative, it means that an expansion of the manufacturing sector requires …rms to pay a wage below the wage paid by the nontraded sector. That is, …rms are losing pro…tability and hence the equilibrium is stable. Conversely, a positive relationship between w i and i implies that agglomeration (an increase in i ) allows …rms to pay higher wages and hence attract workers from the nontraded sector. In this case, …rm pro…tability increases with the size of the manufacturing sector and hence the equilibrium is unstable.
Formally, (13) implies that the manufacturing wage bill is a constant share of revenue, i.e., w i i = (1 ) n i p i . This allows us to express the mass of manufacturing …rms and manufacturing revenue in terms of manufacturing wages and employment:
Next, recall that total expenditure on manufacturing goods equals E i = 1 + n i p i , which can we rewritten using (24) as
The remaining equilibrium conditions needed to track the relationship between w i and i are, …rst, the expression for the price index:
in which n i and p i have been substituted out; and, second, the market clearing condition 30 for a …rm:
Given and i , these equations can be solved for P i , E i and w h .
We are now in the position to study the stability property of the equilibrium. As a preliminary step, we verify that when T h = 0 and adjusts endogenously, as in the previous section, the (unique) equilibrium is always stable. To show this, note that Home expenditure on traded goods is equal to domestic sales plus imports:
Since trade is balanced, the volume of imports is equal to the volume of export:
Hence,
But this is equal to the revenue of the traded sector in Home (domestic sales plus export): (24), we get:
Finally, substituting (25) yields w h = w f f = h : If Foreign is in equilibrium, w f = 1, then the relationship between h and w h is negative. Hence:
the unique symmetric equilibrium is stable:
Starting at the symmetric equilibrium, in which w h = w f = 1, a reallocation of manufacturing workers from Foreign to Home reduces the Home manufacturing wage below the wage paid by the nontraded sector, thereby implying that the symmetric equilibrium is globally stable. Thus, unlike in the standard new economic geography literature in our model agglomeration is impossible when T h is …xed. The intuition for this result is simple: independent of how strong agglomeration forces are, any incipient competitive advantage induced by the operation of agglomeration forces is o¤set by an appreciation of the exchange rate.
Suppose now that the exchange rate is …xed at = 1, i.e., at the symmetric equilibrium, and that the trade surplus T h adjusts according to (18) . In this case, we obtain a system of equations almost identical to that studied in Krugman and Venables (1995) . 22 As in that paper, by linearizing the system of equations in the symmetric equilibrium we can obtain an analytical expression for dw h =d h . This yields the following Proposition (proof in the Appendix):
.
The condition in Proposition 5, which is identical to the one found in Krugman and
Venables (1995) , shows that the symmetric equilibrium can become unstable if is high and and low. Figure 4 shows the critical level of trade costs below which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable as a function of for = 3 and = 5. When the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable, manufacturing …rms start to agglomerate in one country and that country runs a trade surplus. Interestingly, the condition in Proposition 5 is the same as the condition needed for the transfer to trigger an appreciation in Home, an outcome that is not unlikely in our previous simulations. 23 Our analysis suggests a possible reinterpretation of some results in the new economic geography literature. According to the latter, agglomeration is triggered by a change in the structural parameters, such as a reduction in trade costs or an increase in the importance of intermediate goods in manufacturing production. Yet, as we have shown, agglomeration is impossible under balanced trade whenever wages adjust. Our model suggests instead that trade imbalances might be the key: if agglomeration forces are strong enough, a country can become the "world factory"if able and willing to make a large transfer to its trading partners.
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the welfare e¤ects of trade imbalances, treated as an income Realistic calibrations suggest that the price index e¤ect can lower signi…cantly the cost of the transfer. The exact magnitude of the e¤ect depends crucially on parameters that are di¢ cult to measure empirically, like the elasticity of substitution between varieties and trade costs. In all the cases, however, we …nd that a surplus is associated with a sharp increase in the size of the manufacturing sector.
Although derived in a relatively stylized model, these results can help explain several puzzling observations. For instance, the price-index e¤ect can help rationalize why policy makers are often so worried about the decline in manufacturing employment. Our model is also consistent with the observation that developing countries experiencing a productivity take-o¤ in their tradable sectors tend to accumulate foreign assets, i.e., the so called "allocation puzzle" (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013) . However, it would point to causality running from foreign asset accumulation to productivity growth. 24 A careful empirical investigation of these mechanisms is still missing and seems an important challenge for future research in international …nance and trade.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Note …rst that, when N = L h = L f = 1, the model in Section 3 boils down to the following equations:
To study the comparative-statics e¤ects of a small transfer and prove the results in Proposition 3, we linearize the above system in the neighborhood of the symmetric balancedtrade point, i.e., we totally di¤erentiate (28)- (32) with respect to T h in T h = 0. We de…ne b y y 0 =y, where y 0 dy=dT h j T h =0 is the total derivative of a variable in T h = 0. Moreover, we exploit country symmetry, which implies that b y f = b y h .
In the symmetric balanced-trade equilibrium: = 1, n h = n f = n; E h = E f = E and P h = P f = P . Using these in (28)- (30) we obtain:
Totally di¤erentiating (28) and using (33) yields:
Totally di¤erentiating (29) , using (33) and b P f = b P h , yields:
Similarly, totally di¤erentiating (30), using (33) and exploiting country symmetry yields:
Finally, totally di¤erentiating (32), using (33) and again exploiting symmetry yields:
Next, using (36) to eliminate b n h from (34) yields:
Using (38) to eliminate b E h from (37) and (35) yields:
Solving for b P h and b we …nally obtain:
Note that b P h < 0 for (1 ) > 1 , < 1 . Note also that b = negative in the relevant range of . In particular, recalling that = 1 , we have that
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove the results in Proposition 5, we totally di¤erentiate equations (25)- (27) with respect to T h in T h = 0 under the assumption that the exchange rate is exogenously …xed at = 1. Moreover, as in the previous Appendix, we de…ne b y y 0 =y, where y 0 dy=dT h j T h =0 is the total derivative of a variable in T h = 0, and we exploit country symmetry, which implies that b y f = b y h .
Recall that in the symmetric balanced-trade equilibrium:
Thus, totally di¤erentiating (25) and using (42) yields:
Totally di¤erentiating (26) and using (42) yields:
(1 ) b
Totally di¤erentiating (27) and using (42) yields:
Using (43) and (44) to eliminate b E h and b P h from b w h …nally yields:
(1 ) nh (1 )
Note that the denominator of b w h is greater than zero for (1 ) > 1. Moreover, the numerator of b w h is identical to the expression in square brackets on the numerator of b in (40) , which implies that b w h > 0 whenever (41) Notes. Fixed-effects within regressions with standard errors corrected for clustering within countries in parenthesis. *,** = significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The dependent variable is the Industry share of GDP (at current prices), where Industry corresponds to ISIS divisions 10-45. Trade Surplus is net export of goods and services as a share of GDP (at current prices); Income is per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars; Openness is the ratio of total imports and exports to GDP (at current prices). In column (4), observations in which the trade surplus is greater than 0.8 in absolute value are excluded. In columns (5) and (6), trade in services and fuels, respectively, are netted out from the definition of trade surplus; in columns (7) and (8), the trade surplus is instead replaced, respectively, by the current account and international reserves as a share of GDP (at current prices). In columns (9) and (10), all variables are computed as five-year averages. Source: World Bank WDI. Notes. Fixed-effects within regressions with standard errors corrected for clustering within countries in parenthesis. *,** = significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are computed as first differences, of yearly values in column (1)- (8), and of five-year averages in columns (9)- (10) . The dependent variable is the change in the Industry Share of GDP (at current prices), where Industry corresponds to ISIS divisions 10-45. Trade Surplus is net export of goods and services as a share of GDP (at current prices); Income is per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars; Openness is the ratio of total imports and exports to GDP (at current prices). In column (4), observations in which ∆Trade Surplus is greater than 0.2 in absolute value are excluded. In columns (5) and (6) , trade in services and fuels, respectively, are netted out from the definition of trade surplus; in columns (7) and (8), the trade surplus is instead replaced, respectively, by the current account and international reserves as a share of GDP (at current prices). Source: World Bank WDI.
